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Abstract
Using the example of Australian-Indonesian cooperation 
on deterrence of asylum seekers in transit through Indo-
nesia to Australia, this article challenges the view that 
Australia is a regional hegemon. It does this through two 
main methods. First, it engages in a close analysis of the 
shifting relationship between the two countries on refugee 
and asylum-seeker issues through different periods since 
2001 to 2016. This demonstrates that the relationship is in 
fact more nuanced than previously suggested by other schol-
ars. Second, it refers to Thomas Pedersen’s political concept 
of “cooperative hegemony,” which focuses upon “ideational-
institutional realism” as a lens through which to view 
regional co-operation. It analyzes the institutional nature of 
the Australian–Indonesian cooperation relationship in the 
Southeast Asian context, to demonstrate that Australia has 
not established itself as a model of “cooperative hegemony.” 
Résumé
En prenant l’exemple de la coopération australo-indoné-
sienne pour dissuader les demandeurs d’asile traversant 
l’Indonésie sur la route de l’Australie, cet article conteste le 
point de vue d’une hégémonie régionale de l’Australie par 
un travail en deux temps. Il rapporte tout d’abord une ana-
lyse approfondie de la relation ambiguë qu’ont entretenue 
les deux pays sur la question des réfugiés et des demandeurs 
d’asile d’une période à l’autre entre 2001 et 2016, et démontre 
que cette relation est en pratique plus nuancée que celle 
auparavant décrite par d’autres universitaires. Il fait ensuite 
référence au concept politique d’« hégémonie coopérative » 
de Thomas Pedersen, qui met l’accent sur le « réalisme idéa-
tionnel-institutionnel » en tant que prisme d’analyse de la 
coopération régionale, pour examiner la nature institution-
nelle de la relation de coopération qu’entretiennent l’Indo-
nésie et l’Australie dans le contexte du Sud-Est asiatique 
et ainsi démontrer que cette dernière ne s’est pas imposée 
comme modèle d’« hégémonie coopérative ».
Introduction
Although Australia is keen to present itself as a lead-ing power or hegemon and “norm entrepreneur” on refugee and asylum-seeker issues in the Asia-Pacific 
region, I argue that this self-perception is challenged by a 
close examination of Indonesia-Australia cooperation on 
these issues. There are two strands to this argument. First, 
relying upon the legal concept of global refugee protec-
tion, I argue that Australian-Indonesian cooperation is not 
explained primarily by power asymmetry and acquiescence 
with Australia’s “burden-shifting” measures. Second, I refer 
to Thomas Pedersen’s political concept of “cooperative 
hegemony,” which focuses upon “ideational-institutional 
realism” as a lens through which to examine arrangements 
in regional co-operation.1 
The regime of global refugee protection is conceived as 
a “global public good” under which states share the burden 
of such protection.2 The concept of state burden or respon-
sibility sharing underlies the Refugee Convention,3 as noted 
in its Preamble and Article 35, and assumes “an expectation 
of reciprocity” between states.4 However the current reality 
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is that the burden of refugee protection is unevenly shared 
between states in the Global North and South, as most asy-
lum seekers remain in countries close to their homes. This 
is largely a consequence of states in the Global North prac-
tising increasingly diverse non-entrée measures. There is a 
view that the current global response to refugee protection, 
which includes “cooperative deterrence and non-entrée poli-
cies,”5 reflects a “North-South divide” in which developed 
states conscript “less developed countries to act in ways that 
provide a critical support to the developed world’s migration 
control project.”6 This argument assumes an asymmetry in 
power relationships, whereby cooperating states are per-
suaded to act in the interests of the developed states through 
a variety of mechanisms, including financial incentives, the 
provision of training, or deployment of officials. 
In the case of Australia-Indonesia cooperation it has been 
argued that the relationship reflects an “incentivised policy 
transfer,”7 secured through substantial financial and diplo-
matic incentives. I argue that the metaphor of “incentivised 
policy transfer” is an incomplete explanation for Indonesia’s 
apparent cooperation with Australia’s deterrent policies. 
A second strand of my argument is to focus on the role 
of states and institutional structures affecting the Australia–
Indonesia relationship. Two regional institutions are poten-
tial agents of “cooperative hegemony”: ASEAN8 and the Bali 
Process.9 Indonesia is a member state and leading player of 
ASEAN; Australia has many trading partnerships and agree-
ments with ASEAN10 but is not a member state. On the other 
hand, Australia and Indonesia co-chair the Bali Process, which 
also reflects a bilateral arrangement between the two countries. 
In this article I show that ASEAN’s conflicted response to 
refugees is reflected in Indonesia’s national response. As I 
have previously argued, the Bali Process has thus far failed 
to establish itself as either a leading regional institution or as 
“norm entrepreneur” of refugee protection.11 I contend that 
the Australia–Indonesia cooperation relationship mirrors 
the “institutional space”12 created by the Bali Process, rather 
than being a model of “cooperative hegemony.” 
To make the argument against Australia’s role as a regional 
hegemon, I examine three periods of the Australia–Indonesia 
relationship: from 2001 to 2008 (acquiescence with Austral-
ian policies of securitization of refugee and asylum-seeker 
issues); 2008 to 2013 (Indonesian prevarication in the face 
of increasingly aggressive Australian policies); 2013 to the 
present (Indonesia turns to the region during the 2015 Anda-
man Sea crisis). 
Contextual Background 
First some context for the discussion is needed. Indonesia 
and Australia have a shared history in refugee protection 
arising from the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for 
Indo-Chinese Refugees,13 which operated for over two 
decades from 1975.14 This led to lasting legacies on refugee 
policy, which can be described briefly. In Australia it led to 
a clear preference for resettlement as a “durable solution” 
over territorial asylum-seeking.15 Indonesia’s role in refugee 
processing was a reluctant one; nevertheless it cooperated in 
the CPA and tolerated the screening of refugees on Galang 
Island under UNHCR supervision.16 In particular, a presiden-
tial decree recognizing the need for refugee protection was 
issued in 1979.17 As this article demonstrates, Indonesia’s role 
in refugee protection is still a conflicted mixture of tolerance 
and principled recognition, although it has allowed deter-
rent practices to develop. 
There are two important contextual features of the 
Indonesia’s situation vis-à-vis refugees. The first is that as 
the result of its geographical position, in contrast to other 
countries in the region, Indonesia is largely a transit country 
for Australia-bound refugees, including those coming from 
Malaysia to Indonesia. The route through Malaysia devel-
oped in response to the introduction of a stricter visa regime 
in Indonesia in the 2011 law (described below), which in turn 
led to more smuggling from Malaysia to Indonesia.18 Indo-
nesia therefore has a shared or mutual interest with Australia 
in controlling both in- and out-bound migration. 
Second, unlike Malaysia and Thailand (both players with 
Indonesia in the Andaman Sea crisis of 2015), Indonesia is 
not primarily a destination country with large protracted 
refugee populations in need of “durable solutions.” Currently 
Indonesia hosts relatively few (approximately 14,000) asylum 
seekers and refugees, which nevertheless represent a sub-
stantial increase in the last few years as a result of Australia’s 
“containment” policies, explained below. Thailand by contrast 
has 105,935 refugees living in nine long-established refugee 
camps in four provinces along the Thai-Myanmar border.19 
There are urban-based refugees too, albeit in much smaller 
numbers. At the end of 2015, UNHCR in Thailand had regis-
tered 1,830 new urban arrivals.20 In 2015, record numbers of 
refugees arrived in Malaysia, mostly as a result of the Anda-
man Sea crisis. As of June 2016, there were 150,700 refugees 
and asylum seekers registered with UNHCR in Malaysia.21 
Like Indonesia, neither Malaysia nor Thailand is a party to 
the Refugee Convention, and indeed it is suggested they have 
rejected the Convention as a European instrument. A legacy 
of the CPA (in which all three countries participated) is that 
countries in Southeast Asia perceive refugee resettlement as 
an obligation of the “international community.” Within the 
region, refugees overlap with irregular migrant workers and 
stateless persons. As a category of forced migrant, the “refu-
gee” is not well understood.22
All three countries are part of the Bali Process and mem-
ber states of ASEAN. ASEAN takes a somewhat ambiguous 
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approach to refugees.23 On the one hand, refugees are 
included in the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) 
pillar of the ASEAN Community. The APSC subscribes to “a 
comprehensive approach to security, which acknowledges 
the interwoven relationships of political, economic, social-
cultural and environmental dimensions of development.”24 
Within the APSC refugees are constructed, both within a 
national security paradigm as “victims of conflict,” and as 
beneficiaries of a “human security” approach, which rec-
ognizes the risks to regional harmony arising from gaps in 
economic development.
On the other hand, refugee rights are provided in the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD).25 The AHRD, Arti-
cle 2, provides guarantees for the very freedoms that are at 
the base of the need for refugee status in the region, namely 
freedom from discrimination on the basis of “race, gender, 
age, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, economic status, birth, disability or other 
status.” Article 14 of the ADHR enshrines the principle of non-
refoulement when it states without qualification, “No person 
shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment.” Articles 15 and 16 refer to the 
right to freedom of movement and specifically to the right to 
seek asylum.
As stated, Indonesia’s response to Australia on refugee 
issues is largely referenced to its position as a transit coun-
try. However, Indonesia has long-standing experience with 
“forced” migration as internal migration and as outward-
bound labour migration, which overlaps with the issue of 
human trafficking, which it has been addressing since at 
least 2002. Indonesia is also considered to be a leader within 
ASEAN, particularly in the APSC area, as a result of its strategic 
location in the Straits of Malacca, and its interest in regional 
and maritime security.26 
Within the region, Australia has concluded other bilat-
eral agreements that extend Australia’s deterrent policies to 
asylum seekers to processing in off-shore sites. This is both 
a legacy of and the continuation of a policy of discourag-
ing on-shore or “spontaneous” asylum seekers, which began 
from Australia’s experience with the CPA. During the 1990s 
Australian policies became increasingly focussed on con-
taining refugees in transit to Australia in offshore locations. 
The “Pacific Strategy,” as it was initially termed, arose from 
bilateral relationships recorded in memorandums of under-
standing (MOUs) between Australia and Nauru and Australia 
and Manus Island (Papua New Guinea). It involved the 
interdiction and transfer of asylum seekers by the Australian 
Navy to “safe third countries,” which were in reality cash-
strapped Pacific Islands willing to enter into arrangements 
with Australia. Under these MOUs the Australian govern-
ment directed and financed the detention and processing of 
asylum seekers in offshore locations. In this period Australia 
“externalized” its border control through the positioning of 
airline liaison officers (ALOs)27 in Southeast Asia and provi-
sion of Australian Federal Police (AFP) training on people 
smuggling.28 For similar motives, Australia was developing 
a relationship with Indonesia, to which I now turn. 
Indonesian Pragmatism 2001–2008: Acquiescent 
Protection and Securitization 
Australia’s Pacific Solution I, which operated in 2001–8, was 
a seemingly ad hoc response to the arrival of a Norwegian 
registered container ship, the MV Tampa, in Australian 
waters with a cargo of 433 asylum seekers in transit from 
Indonesia. This staged event, which took place in late August 
2001 on the eve of an Australian federal election,29 ensured 
the re-election of Prime Minister John Howard and enabled 
the passage of a suite of legislation that established offshore 
processing.30 Far from being a spontaneous gesture, the 
creation of the Pacific Solution was a response to a spike in 
boat arrivals from Indonesia in the eighteen months leading 
up to early 2001. The majority of these arrivals were part of 
the “Afghan diaspora” of 2001 when an estimated 900,000 
people fled Afghanistan. 
Pacific Solution I was directed at asylum seekers who 
had made “secondary movements,” mainly from Indone-
sia, although in the period before the Tampa incident the 
numbers were declining and continued to decline in 2001–8. 
Moreover, Australia and Indonesia were establishing a coop-
erative arrangement known as the Regional Cooperation 
Model 2000 (RCM), which was later formalized through 
the Bali Process as the Regional Cooperation Arrangement 
(RCA). 
At the time of the Tampa incident, the apparent unwill-
ingness of President Megawati Sukarnoputri to take a phone 
call from the Australian prime minister provided a snapshot 
of the relationship between the two states. The Australian 
authorities had implied that the asylum seekers were Indone-
sia’s responsibility by requesting the captain of the MV Tampa 
to return them to Indonesia. At the time Indonesia was cop-
ing with its own internal “refugee” or displaced population 
of 1.3 million people. 
The number of persons held under the Pacific Solution I 
peaked in February 2002 at 1,550. It was originally intended 
that the asylum seekers held on Nauru and Manus Island 
would be processed within six months of their arrival. But 
the processing was painfully slow as the government waited 
for the situations in the countries of origin to stabilize, pre-
sumably so that the asylum seekers could be returned home.31 
However, by May 2005 65.5 per cent of the Pacific Solution I 
asylum seekers had been resettled (mainly in Australia and 
New Zealand), and Pacific Solution I was wound back.32 The 
Volume 33 Refuge Number 1
31
eventual demise of Pacific Solution I was bound up with the 
defeat of the Liberal-National Party Coalition (the Coalition) 
by the Rudd Labor government in the November 2007 elec-
tion.33 In February 2008 Pacific Solution I was wound up.34 
During this period there were two countervailing devel-
opments in the Australia–Indonesia relationship on refugee 
protection. The first was the endorsement of the RCA, which 
cemented refugee protection in Indonesia, and the second 
was the creation of the Bali Process, which was focused on 
irregular migration. At the same time, there were develop-
ments in Indonesia’s laws on refugee protection that ran 
counter to Australia’s efforts under the Bali Process. These 
developments suggest a conflicted Indonesian approach to 
refugee protection. 
The Regional Cooperative Arrangement and the Bali Process
Australia-Indonesia cooperation on asylum seekers dating 
from the late 1990s was formalized through the Bali Process 
as the Regional Cooperation Arrangement (RCA). The RCA 
also describes the roles of the Intergovernmental Organisa-
tion for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR. Thus the RCA is 
a bilateral agreement between two states that involves a 
non-state actor (the UNHCR) and an intergovernmental actor. 
Under this agreement IOM and UNHCR act in place of the 
two states, Australia and Indonesia. That is, Indonesia is 
willing to delegate its role to non-state/interstate institutions, 
namely UNHCR and IOM. Australia, on the other hand, has 
the practical necessity to work through IOM in Indonesia.
The RCA requires the Indonesian government to intercept 
and detain “Australia bound” “irregular migrants,” to notify 
IOM, which is to provide advice and assistance (particularly 
about “voluntary return”), and then (if needed) UNHCR will 
assess their claims. Under the RCA it is envisaged that Indo-
nesian officials will refer asylum seekers to IOM for “case 
management and care,” who then refer them to UNHCR to 
make asylum claims, if they express a wish to do so. UNHCR 
performs refugee status determinations (RSD) because Indo-
nesia is not a party to the Refugee Convention. IOM as an 
intergovernmental body is funded by interested govern-
ments and in particular by the Australian government in 
relation to its activities in Indonesia. 
The RCA prioritizes the role of IOM. Within Indonesia IOM 
has greater visibility (it has more offices than UNHCR, which 
is often co-located with IOM)35 and arguably more power 
because of its role under the RCA as the first port of call. 
Whereas IOM has many offices, UNHCR has only one official 
office in Jakarta in central Java. 
Initially Indonesia tolerated the presence of asylum seek-
ers on its territory (the RCA itself speaks to that, as do the 
legislative policies detailed below), but from 2004 onwards 
there was an increasing emphasis on detention, which 
involved IOM and Australian funding. Initially asylum seek-
ers registered with UNHCR, but falling outside the scope of 
the RCA, were not usually detained, but had their wherea-
bouts monitored by UNHCR.36 After the commencement 
of the RCA the focus of IOM’s role shifted from Australian-
funded accommodation in five designated areas37 to deten-
tion. A second bilateral arrangement between Indonesia and 
Australia commenced in 2007. This was the Management 
and Care of Irregular Immigrants Project, funded by Aus-
tralia, which led to the creation of more detention facilities, 
managed by IOM.38 
Further Australia-Indonesian cooperation in this period 
promoted a securitized approach to irregular migration. 
In 2006–7 Australia supported the implementation of the 
Enhanced Cekal System (ECS)—a border alert system that 
would “assist Indonesia to detect the movement of terror-
ists and other transnational criminals.”39 Australia also con-
cluded an MOU with Indonesia on cooperation on migration 
and border control management.40 The impact of the Bali 
Process (which formally began in 2002, met again in 2003, 
then not again until 2009)41 was mainly in the area of capac-
ity-building in Indonesia. For example, in a speech made 
in 2004 by Caroline Millar, the Australian “ambassador for 
smuggling issues” under the Bali Process,42 it was explained 
that Australia was assisting Indonesia to draft anti-smuggling 
laws, and providing capacity-building “to deal with illegal 
immigration in areas such as border management, visa sys-
tems and the verification of identity and nationality.”43 
The result of this collaboration was a law that Indonesia 
introduced in 2011—Law 6/2011 “Concerning Immigration” 
discussed below, which introduced new anti-smuggling laws. 
In her speech Millar referred to Australia’s “strong political 
support in the region.” She mentioned that it promoted its 
agenda “through capacity-building activities and practical 
workshops,” and cooperation on addressing people smug-
gling and trafficking. Her speech made it clear that Australia 
saw itself as a hegemonic force in the region, acting through 
the Bali Process. However, the evidence suggests that the Bali 
Process had limited regional impact in this period beyond 
the bilateral relationship.44 Although Indonesia is a co-chair 
of the Bali Process, during this period it did not assert its 
role. However, at the 2003 meeting the Indonesian minister 
for foreign affairs made a rare statement acknowledging the 
protection needs of refugees.45 This statement is consistent 
with the RCA and Indonesian legislative policies that recog-
nize the status of “refugee.” 
Indonesian Legislative Policies and State Responsibility
Indonesia was aware of refugee protection principles from 
the 1950s. A 1956 circular letter recognized the need for 
protection of “political” refugees.46 Further Indonesia’s 
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participation in the post-Bandung Asian-African Legal 
Consultative Organisation from 1956 (and in the 2001 refor-
mulation of its principles) demonstrates its awareness of 
broader principles of refugee protection, both as Convention 
refugees and under the expanded refugee definition.47 Yet 
despite recognition of refugees in its laws and policies, Indo-
nesia has not become a party to the Refugee Convention, 
partly because it fears the “pull factor” of such a move,48 but 
also because of concerns about the cost of refugee protection. 
Some commentators suggest that the CPA experience 
had some impact on the Indonesian state, as UNHCR started 
“awareness-raising” about refugee protection in Indonesia in 
1981. Indeed laws dating from 1998 recognize asylum seek-
ers.49 The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and laws 
recognize asylum seekers, although not in the same terms of 
the Refugee Convention definition. They create two categories 
of refugees: political and “foreign” refugees. They are framed 
under two concepts: those who have human rights needs and 
those who need the protection of another country. The Con-
stitution, Article 28G(2), recognizes the right to freedom from 
torture and to obtain “political asylum from another country.” 
Law no. 37 of 1999 on Foreign Relations incorporates three 
articles relating to “foreign refugees.” For example, Article 26: 
“The granting of asylum to foreign nationals shall be exercised 
in accordance with national legislation taking into account 
international law, custom and practice” (my emphasis).
Article 27 contains provisions requiring the president 
to determine policy on “(foreign) refugees” and to create 
a presidential decision. Moreover Law No. 39 of 1999 on 
Human Rights contains the right to political asylum as set 
out in the Constitution. 
Indonesia is a party to the two general human rights instru-
ments that recognize the right to freedom from torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment.50 Thus it is aware of inter-
national human rights obligations owed to asylum seekers. 
The UNHCR’s role under the RCA is recognized in admin-
istrative policies that acknowledge the non-refoulement prin-
ciple, which is contained in Indonesia’s Constitution and its 
laws. In 2002 a circular “regarding Procedures regarding 
Aliens Expressing Their Desire to Seek Asylum or Refugee 
Status” was created.51 Subsequently the 2010 Directive of the 
Director General of Immigration52 was issued, to provide 
for security of status if UNHCR has affirmed the status of an 
asylum seeker through a RSD procedure. The 2010 directive 
ensures that refugees and asylum seekers have access to 
UNHCR, and allows them to stay temporarily in the country 
until their refugee status can be confirmed and appropri-
ate solutions can be found for them. It affirms the effect of 
the 2002 circular and the terms of the RCA described above. 
Although the 2010 directive is titled an instrument “Regard-
ing Handling of Irregular Migrants,” defined as persons 
who “subsequently declare themselves as asylum seekers and 
refugee(s),” it confirms the non-refoulement obligation. 
It is clear then that Indonesia was and is well aware of 
its international obligations to asylum seekers/refugees. 
Although not a party to the Refugee Convention, it has 
long acknowledged underlying international principles and 
its obligations in its Constitution and its laws. Soeprapto, 
writing in 2004,53 says that until 2000 the response of the 
government to accession to the Refugee Convention was 
“encouraging.”54 But the current Indonesian government has 
shelved plans to accede to the Convention, despite positive 
indications in the first part of the twenty-first century.55 
In this period the Indonesian response to Australian 
intervention was pragmatic and compliant with securitiza-
tion, but this was tempered by tolerance and “humanitarian” 
refugee protection for asylum seekers transiting through 
Indonesia. However when Australia granted asylum to a 
group of Indonesian West Papuan refugees in 2006, Indo-
nesia was outraged.56 This period coincided with an initial 
increase and then decline in the number of asylum seekers 
transiting to Australia. In the securitized period from 2008 
onwards when numbers increased once more, a more com-
plex relationship developed. 
Indonesian Prevarication 2008–2013: Conflicted 
State Responses
In the period from 2008 to 2013, in an attempt to stem the 
increasing arrival of asylum seekers from Indonesia (and 
Sri Lanka) to Australia, first the Rudd and then the Gillard 
Labor government focused upon “breaking the people smug-
glers’ business model.”57 With the return of the Coalition in 
2013 and the creation of Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) 
in September of that year, the rhetoric shifted to “stopping 
the boats.” Under OSB, in increasingly bold unilateral meas-
ures that breach international law, Australia has exploited 
its impunity from external forums. Australia has practised 
interdictions, turn-back and tow-back policies of dubious 
legality under international law,58 which have increasingly 
angered Indonesian authorities.59 There are now many 
examples of the “illegality” of Australia’s policies under 
international law.60 During this period, relations between 
Australia and Indonesia were strained by incursions into its 
waters. In November 2013 Indonesia suspended cooperation 
on migrant smuggling as a result of tensions arising from 
Australia’s OSB.61 In other incidents Australian officials paid 
Indonesian fishermen to transport asylum seekers back to 
Indonesian shores.62 
IOM and UNHCR: Challenging Roles 
In this period, as a result of Australian influence, Indonesia 
moved to a seemingly less tolerant approach, framing asylum 
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seekers as illegal immigrants, and acceding to creation of 
detention facilities.63 This change has affected the roles of 
IOM and UNHCR. IOM has been the recipient of increased 
funding, whereas UNHCR funding has had to stretch further 
to cope with increasing numbers of asylum seekers stuck in 
transit in Indonesia. This resulted from the announcement 
in November 2014 that Australia would no longer resettle 
asylum seekers transiting from Indonesia. As there has been 
substantial increase in the number of asylum seekers in 
Indonesia, UNHCR struggles to keep up with the demand for 
processing of claims, with waiting times increasing. 
Australia funds both the UNHCR and IOM, but it appears 
that IOM receives more funding than UNHCR for its activi-
ties in Indonesia.64 For example during 2008–9, Australia 
allocated: 
• $807,727 to UNHCR in Indonesia for protection capac-
ity-building activities;
• $1,600,000 to IOM for interpreting services for dis-
placed persons in Indonesia;
• $386,000 to IOM for educational and social services 
for refugees and irregular migrants in Indonesia.65
The Australian-funded increase in Indonesia’s detention 
capacity has been matched by an increased tendency of 
Indonesian officials to detain (consistent with the new laws 
described below). 
In 2014, according to IOM there were thirteen Immigra-
tion Detention Centres in thirteen provinces, operating 
under “arbitrary rules.”66 In 2015 UNHCR added that there 
were twenty further temporary detention facilities and 4,511 
detainees. UNHCR reported that it had intervened in 856 
cases to secure release from detention of vulnerable peo-
ple (such as pregnant women and young children). It also 
reported that a number of asylum seekers in the community 
self-report for detention because they are unable to support 
themselves (asylum seekers are not permitted to work). Both 
IOM and UNHCR report severe overcrowding in detention 
facilities in Indonesia. 
From 2010 IOM has been funded by Australia to run Pub-
lic Information Campaigns (PICs), which are basically aimed 
at deterring Indonesian coastal communities from becom-
ing involved in people smuggling. The PICs depict asylum 
seekers as “illegals” and invoke religious principles and 
deploy religious leaders to conceptualize people-smuggling 
as a sin.67 According to an IOM evaluation of a PIC, it led to 
a “radical shift in public opinion regarding the social and 
economic impact of people smuggling … from one of gen-
eral acceptance/tolerance … to one of virtually unanimous 
rejection of people smuggling.”68 An alternative view of the 
effect of the PICs is that they lead to practices that involve 
surveillance by members of the community, that is, state-
society “border-control.”69 
Legislative Response: The Dubious Effect of People-
Smuggling Laws
The result of the Australia-led capacity-building described 
above was a new law that Indonesia introduced in 2011—Law 
6/2011 “Concerning Immigration”—which replaced the 1992 
law. The 1992 law had justified the regulation of the “traffic of 
people” as “one manifestation of sovereignty as an independ-
ent legal state based on the rule of law.” It imposed a require-
ment on “foreign nationals” to possess a visa (Article 6) but 
made no specific provision for asylum seekers or refugees. 
As Crouch and Missbach point out,70 it contained a number 
of provisions that could be and were used against “irregular” 
migrants and people smugglers. 
Indonesia’s Law 6/2011 focuses on irregular migration and 
the creation of smuggling offences. The preamble to this new 
law acknowledges that “today’s global development drives 
greater mobility of people in the world … protection and 
promotion of the human rights are required.” Yet Law 6/2011 
is designed to make asylum seekers “irregular.” Graeme 
Hugo found that 84 per cent of asylum seekers entered Indo-
nesia illegally because they could not comply with the legal 
immigration requirements.71 Thus Australia “exported” its 
policies of preventing movement of asylum seekers, as well 
as detention, to Indonesia. 
However, the deterrent effect of the anti-smuggling laws 
is debatable.72 They have been used mainly to prosecute 
“low-level” criminals, and the sentences imposed have been 
lenient.73 There is evidence that in the Indonesian context 
of “porous borders,” a range of factors results in “less than 
efficient border control,” and the anti-smuggling law leads 
to practices (as do the PICs) that involve surveillance by 
members of the community.74 Corruption is rife, and the law 
arguably has a corrupting effect on the rule of law as mem-
bers of the community are encouraged to “dob in” irregular 
migrants. Barker points out that a number of people con-
victed for smuggling under the legislation were themselves 
former asylum seekers “drawn into people smuggling” while 
in that situation in Indonesia.75 
It seems that the effect of Australian anti-smuggling pol-
icy vis-à-vis Indonesia has had the effect of “commodifying” 
refugees/asylum seekers76 through the creation of a deten-
tion “industry” and by putting a price on asylum seekers in 
the minds of the community. This is in conflict with Indone-
sian laws and policies on protection of asylum seekers. 
2009: A Watershed Year—Revival of the Bali Process and 
Cracks in the Australia–Indonesia Relationship 
While Indonesia increasingly securitized its response to asy-
lum seekers and simultaneously tolerated UNHCR’s protection 
work on its soil, the formal Bali Process lay dormant from 
2003. But in April 2009 the Third Bali Regional Ministerial 
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Conference (BRMC) was convened in response to increasing 
tensions in the region, following an increase in post-conflict 
asylum seekers from Sri Lanka and Pakistan. At this time, 
there was also concern about the treatment of Rohingyas flee-
ing from Myanmar.77 Following the Third BRMC, a Regional 
Immigration Liaison Network and a Regional Cooperation 
Framework (RCF) concept were developed and endorsed by 
ministers at the fourth BRMC in 2011. Simultaneously, the 
UNHCR and IOM were incorporated more closely into the Bali 
Process, in particular to advance the RCF concept, and the 
establishment of a Regional Support Office to “support and 
strengthen practical cooperation on refugee protection.”78 
Two contemporaneous incidents involving “boat people” 
in transit to Australia from Indonesia in late September 2009 
show that Indonesia’s response at this point is not defined 
by compliance with Australian policy. They involved two 
boatloads of Sri Lankan asylum seekers detected en route 
to Australia from Indonesia. There had been an increased 
outflow of Sri Lankan Tamil asylum seekers in the region 
following the cessation of hostilities in mid-2009. It was 
claimed at the time that Australian-funded surveillance at 
Colombo airport was partly responsible for the large outflow 
of Sri Lankan asylum seekers by boat.79
The first boat, the “Jaya Lestari 5,” with 255 Sri Lankans was 
returned to the Indonesian port of Merak by the Australian 
Navy following an arrangement between Australia’s Prime 
Minister Rudd and the Indonesian president. These asylum 
seekers remained on board in Merak port for six months and 
refused to enter Indonesia for fear of being detained. In an 
interview given in mid-October 2009, Prime Minister Rudd 
referred to the fact that this was one of eighty-one “separate 
disruptions” of departing boats “in partnership with our 
Indonesian friends.”80 Although the Australian government 
promised A$50 million to fund policing and processing of 
asylum seekers in Indonesia, the Indonesian government 
initially refused to intervene to forcibly remove the “Jaya 
Lestari 5” refugees.81
The second boatload of seventy-eight Sri Lankan asylum 
seekers was rescued by the Australian Customs Ship, the 
Oceanic Viking, and taken to Bintan Island for processing in 
an IOM-managed detention centre. This move led to a dip-
lomatic incident: the provincial governor would not allow 
the asylum seekers to disembark, and the asylum seekers 
refused to disembark until given assurances that their claims 
for refugee status and resettlement would be processed 
swiftly. After a stalemate of some weeks, the asylum seekers 
disembarked and were processed rapidly amidst outcries of 
favoured treatment. Although most were resettled in Aus-
tralia, a small percentage were taken by other countries. The 
Oceanic Viking incident in particular led to political turmoil 
for Prime Minister Rudd. 
Following these incidents, the number of boat people 
arriving in Australian waters increased to the extent that by 
early 2010 Christmas Island, which was being used for off-
shore processing, was at 95 per cent capacity. During 2009–
10 period, 2,727 boat people arrived in Australian waters.82 
The offshore processing on Christmas Island, dubbed the 
“Indian Ocean Solution,” was becoming intractable. As a con-
sequence of Indonesia’s recalcitrance, the Labor government 
turned to another solution. 
Unintended Consequences: The Australia-Malaysia 
Agreement 2011
In contrast to Indonesia’s prevarication in response to 
Australian pressure in 2009, the Australia-Malaysia Agree-
ment 2011, which is described in this section is an example 
of an asymmetric power relationship, frames Australia as a 
regional hegemon. The arrangement was intended to deter 
asylum seekers intending to travel to Australia, but also to 
alleviate Malaysia’s refugee problem as the site of one of the 
largest “protracted refugee situations” in Southeast Asia. 
Essentially it was a trade in refugees, intended to swap refu-
gees under Australia’s control for some of Malaysia’s “pro-
tracted” refugees. 
On 25 July 2011 an Arrangement between the Government 
of Australia and the Government of Malaysia on Transfer 
and Resettlement (the Arrangement) was concluded by the 
Labor government. This bilateral agreement made under 
the Bali Process was for the exchange of 800 asylum seekers 
arriving “irregularly” by boat in Australian excised terri-
tory,83 with up to 4,000 recognized refugees awaiting reset-
tlement in Malaysia. By a majority of 6:1 the High Court in 
Plaintiffs M70/2011 and M106/201184 decided that the declara-
tion was an invalid exercise of power. An important aspect 
of this arrangement was the designated roles of two institu-
tions: IOM and UNHCR. 
Under the arrangement, a transferee from Australia, “if 
determined to be a refugee … will be referred to resettle-
ment countries pursuant to UNHCR’s normal processes and 
criteria.”85 That is, there was no expectation created that 
the asylum seeker would be resettled in Australia. However, 
clause 5 of the arrangement specified that up to 4,000 refu-
gees registered with UNHCR in Malaysia would be considered 
for resettlement in Australia. Under the arrangement, it was 
intended that IOM and the UNHCR would have significant 
roles. Indeed clause 3 stated, “This Arrangement will pro-
ceed on the basis that UNHCR and the International Organi-
zation for Migration (IOM) can fulfill the roles and functions 
envisaged in the Operational Guidelines at Annex A.”
The Operational Guidelines86 to the Arrangement antici-
pated that the care of asylum seekers in Malaysia would be 
the responsibility of IOM and UNHCR. This was ultimately 
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fatal to the legality of the declaration of the minister for 
immigration under the Migration Act when he declared that 
Malaysia was (effectively) a “safe third country” for the pur-
pose of implementing the Arrangement. On the facts, in light 
of the terms of the Migration Act, the High Court decided 
(essentially) that the minister could not have reasonably 
made that decision. In essence the High Court upheld the 
principle that the refugees from Christmas Island remained 
Australia’s responsibility, which Australia could not offload 
to non-state/interstate actors.87 Moreover if Australia was to 
transfer its responsibility to another state, it had to ensure 
that “effective” state protection was accessible.88 This was 
patently not the case with Malaysia. 
This was a situation where resettlement was proposed 
for strategic purposes but in contrasting circumstances to 
the Indonesian situation. Whereas the RCA and other laws 
and policies acknowledge the presence and roles of IOM and 
UNHCR in Indonesia, within Malaysia their status and role 
is more precarious. For example, recently the Malaysian 
government directed the UNHCR not to register any further 
refugees; Malaysia does not officially recognize IOM. The 
Malaysia Arrangement was an example of a regional bilateral 
agreement involving the use of superior bargaining power by 
Australia. 
The Andaman Sea Crisis: Indonesia Engages with 
the Region 
From about 2008, there was an escalation of departures of 
the Rohingya from Myanmar and pushbacks by the Thai 
navy,89 which led to the revival of the Bali Process in 2009. 
In 2012 Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN secretary-general (2008–12), 
urged ASEAN to act collectively, as it had done during the 
Indochinese refugee crisis (CPA). However neither ASEAN 
nor the Bali Process tackled the issue at this point. As the 
crisis escalated, in an apparent show of independence, in 
2013 Indonesia convened with UNHCR, a Special Confer-
ence on Addressing Irregular Movement of People outside 
the Bali Process.90 In a statement at the conference, Volker 
Turk expressed UNHCR’s concerns with regional deterrence 
and pushback practices, which were modelled on Austral-
ian policies. The ensuing Jakarta Declaration on Addressing 
Irregular Movement of Persons pledged countries of origin, 
transit, and destination to work together to address irregular 
migration.91 
In this final section I show that a defining moment in 
the Australia–Indonesia relationship was the rejection of 
Australia’s pushback policies by regional and international 
actors (including Indonesia) in responding to the Rohingya 
“crisis” in Southeast Asia in May 2015.92 Moreover Indonesia 
engaged with Malaysia and Thailand to end a stalemate on 
the crisis. More recently, Indonesia adhered to its rejection 
of pushback policies by permitting a group of Sri Lankan 
asylum seekers who had failed to reach Australia to land on 
Aceh to be assessed under the RCA.93 
Regional Response to the Crisis
Estimates differ but some suggest that as many as 6,500 
persons departed from Myanmar and Bangladesh mainly 
by boat in 2015.94 In May 2015 the discovery of twenty-six 
bodies in a mass grave of smuggled Rohingya in a trafficking 
camp in southern Thailand95 signalled the urgent need to 
tackle this situation. This led to attempts to push the “blame” 
for the crisis onto Thailand for failing to solve the trade and 
“trafficking” of “illegal immigrants.” At this point states in the 
region (Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia) continued push-
backs of boats carrying the Rohingya people and called for 
the “richer” countries to settle the refugees. 
A couple of “circuit breakers” arose when it became clear 
that the international community was not rushing to the res-
cue. The first was a statement by the Philippines government 
on 18 May that it would not push back the Rohingya but 
would shelter up to 3,000 people. The second was more sym-
bolic. On 19 May 2015 a group of fishermen from Aceh defied 
the Indonesian government’s pushback policy and rescued 
a group of “boat migrants.” A tone of moral high ground 
also entered the debate when parallels between Australia’s 
pushback policy and the regional response were drawn. One 
commentator referred to the “pernicious influence” of Aus-
tralia’s “stop the boats” policy.96
From that point the three most affected states (Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Malaysia) began to work cooperatively to bro-
ker a solution to the crisis. The ministers of foreign affairs of 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand met on 20 May 2015 ahead 
of an international meeting on 29 May, to discuss the issue 
of “irregular movement of people” into Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand. It was stated that the purpose of the meeting 
was for “finding a solution to the crisis of influx of irregular 
migrants and its serious impact on the national security of 
the affected countries.”97 The joint statement issued follow-
ing the meeting of 20 May 2015 asserted that these three 
states had taken “necessary measures … on humanitarian 
grounds, beyond their international obligations,”98 as “the 
issue cannot be addressed solely by these three countries.” 
In their statement the states appealed to ASEAN and to the 
“spirit of unity and solidarity of ASEAN,” to play an active role 
in addressing the issue. They asserted the need to address 
the “root causes. The ministers pledged to uphold their 
“responsibilities and obligations under international law and 
in accordance with their respective domestic laws, includ-
ing the provision of humanitarian assistance to … those 
7,000 irregular migrants still at sea.”99 They agreed to offer 
them temporary shelter, “provided that the resettlement and 
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repatriation process will be done in one year by the inter-
national community.” Malaysia and Indonesia invited other 
countries in the region “to join in this endeavour.”
The seventeen recommendations in the 29 May state-
ment by states following the Special Meeting on Irregular 
Migration100 largely endorse those of 20 May. They focus 
upon preventing irregular migration and responding to the 
issue of “human trafficking” and “people smuggling” rather 
than lasting solutions. Only the final recommendation (q), 
which referred to root causes and improving livelihoods in 
“at-risk communities,” alluded to the protection needs of the 
Rohingya. 
The outcome of the 29 May meeting was condemned by 
human rights advocates who pointed to the failure to pro-
vide asylum procedures and durable solutions.101 The cur-
rent situation of the Rohingya refugees supports this critique. 
A year later, a number of commentators took stock of the 
issue.102 According to a number of reports, although the 
regional government of Aceh (Indonesia) took in about 1,000 
Rohingya, by early 2016 only about 400 remained. This was 
attributed to Aceh’s ad hoc response to refugee protection. In 
contradiction to national policy, this cohort of asylum seek-
ers was detained in camps under poor conditions. Gradually 
many moved to Malaysia. There it is reported that of about 
1,100 Rohingya, 50 have been resettled to third countries, 
670 returned home, and about 400 remain in detention. The 
crisis appears not to have improved protection outcomes or 
norms in the region. In April 2016 Thailand blocked an effort 
by a private enterprise to continue to rescue migrants at sea, 
after it had rescued about 13,000 migrants at sea.103 
In this context ASEAN remained passive, but the Bali Pro-
cess was finally reconvened in March 2016 to formulate an 
“urgent and collective response” in the form of a new Bali 
Declaration on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons 
and Related Transnational Crime.104 In the lead up to this 
meeting a number of commentators urged the Bali Process 
to “step up” to the challenge of regional refugee protection.105 
However the focus of the 2016 Declaration is upon “transna-
tional organised crime.” For example, it is ingeniously stated 
in paragraph 2, “The decline in irregular movement of per-
sons in these waters in the second half of 2015, [is] attribut-
able to the resolute actions by affected countries to disrupt 
smuggling networks, among other factors.” 
Although the 2016 Declaration recognizes the need “to 
identify and provide safety and protection” and to “address 
the root causes,” the focus of the measures is on “irregular 
migrants” and “mixed migratory movements.”106 Con-
crete measures suggested are to “enhance safe and orderly 
migration pathways, including for migrant workers,” but for 
refugees the states are merely encouraged to “explore poten-
tial temporary protection and local stay arrangements for 
asylum seekers and refugees, subject to domestic laws and 
policies of member states.”107
In this respect the Declaration acknowledges “the need 
for adequate access to irregular migrants wherever they are, 
by humanitarian providers especially the UNHCR and the 
IOM, as appropriate.”108
The Declaration was badged as Australia’s initiative109 “to 
counter this terrible trade in human beings.” But Indonesia’s 
reaction to it shows the gap between the two countries. As 
mentioned above, one consequence of Australian policies 
is the increase in asylum seekers in Indonesia in need of 
resettlement in third countries. In commenting on the Dec-
laration, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi called 
for countries to assist with the resettlement of the more 
than 13,000 refugees and asylum seekers registered with the 
UNHCR in Indonesia. She said, “Of course there is hope from 
Indonesia not only to Australia but to every country to be 
more receptive to these migrants who have been waiting for 
resettlement.”110 But the Declaration makes no reference to 
resettlement outcomes. 
Conclusions 
For the purpose of examining the proposition that Australia 
is a regional hegemon on refugee issues, I examined Aus-
tralian-Indonesian cooperation over three periods to dem-
onstrate that it is not explained primarily by power asym-
metry and acquiescence with Australia’s “burden-shifting” 
measures; the metaphor of “incentivised policy transfer” is 
an incomplete explanation for Indonesia’s apparent coopera-
tion with Australia’s deterrent policies. 
I have shown that in the first period, 2001–8, the relation-
ship is characterized by Indonesia’s conflicted response: tol-
erance of refugee protection is tempered by pragmatic acqui-
escence to the demand for increasingly securitized measures 
by Australia. In the second period, 2008–13, the relationship 
becomes more complex and Indonesian responses more 
fragmented, so that it is indeed difficult to describe an Indo-
nesian response. This is because regional, private, non-state, 
and interstate actors are involved. In the final period cover-
ing the Rohingya crisis in the region, Indonesia separates 
itself from Australian influence and displays more connec-
tion with the region on resolution of the crisis. Moreover, it 
continues, albeit in a shaky way, its policy of tolerant protec-
tion. In this crisis the consequences of Australia’s policies on 
Indonesia’s refugee “problem” and the differences between 
the needs of the two countries become apparent. Indonesia’s 
current focus is on its own needs and those of the region.111 
Several features of the Indonesia–Australia relationship 
become clear through close analysis of their cooperative 
relationship on transit refugees. First, Indonesia does not do 
Australia’s bidding on all occasions, and when it does, it is 
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probably motivated as much by self-interest and other fac-
tors that reflect its geopolitical position,112 as by maintaining 
good relationships with Australia. Indonesia’s comparatively 
passive response to Australian policy contrasts with its pro-
active role in ASEAN forums. As I heard one Indonesian offi-
cial say at a seminar on human trafficking held in Bandung 
in November 2012, Indonesia is more interested in policing 
its northern waters and trading routes than in its southern 
or Australia-oriented waters. Second, although there is Indo-
nesian national law and policy on refugee protection, it is 
difficult to assume that there is a united Indonesian response 
to refugees or to Australian pressure, as events in 2009 dem-
onstrated. Further, Aceh’s response to Rohingya refugees 
demonstrates the fragmented nature of the Indonesian state 
in realist terms. These facts weaken the argument that Aus-
tralia is a hegemon in the Indonesia–Australia relationship. 
In this article, referring to Thomas Pedersen’s concept of 
“cooperative hegemony,” which focuses upon “ideational-
institutional realism” and using the example of Indonesia-
Australia cooperation on transit refugees, I have argued 
against Australia’s presentation of itself as a leading power or 
hegemon and “norm entrepreneur” on refugee and asylum-
seeker issues. 
The Bali Process is the main institution through which 
Australia can assert its role as a regional hegemon and under 
the Indonesia–Australia relationship. But as the 2016 Bali 
Declaration on People Smuggling demonstrates, it appears 
to be the facilitator/enabler of Australian policy focused on 
transnational organized crime and mixed migratory move-
ments rather than on refugee protection. It represents an 
“institutional gap” rather than a hegemonic institution. The 
recent episode involving Sri Lankan asylum seekers on Aceh 
shows the yawning gap between Indonesian and Australian 
responses to refugees under the Bali Process. Moreover, on 
refugee issues the 2016 Bali Declaration acknowledges the 
need to pursue refugee protection through international 
non-state and interstate actors. This fact is also recognized in 
the RCA, which governs the Indonesia-Australia cooperation. 
Turning to the regional institutional framework and situ-
ation, it is clear that both ASEAN and its member states failed 
to promote lasting solutions during the Andaman Sea crisis. 
Despite the promise of the ADHR, state responses show that 
permanent refugee protection, at least in the form of reset-
tlement outcomes, is seen to be the responsibility of the 
international community. 
Another important aspect of the situation challenges the 
idea of “cooperative hegemony” in realist terms. I have dem-
onstrated an increasing tendency for states in the region to 
pursue refugee protection through international non-state 
and interstate actors. Rather than being a model of “coop-
erative hegemony,” the Bali Process reveals through the 2016 
Declaration, and in the Australia–Indonesia RCA coopera-
tion relationship, the “institutional space”113 that is filled by 
the UNHCR and IOM. 
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